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Revitalizing FRCP 68: Can Offers
of Judgment Provide Adequate
Incentives for Fair, Early
Settlement of Fee-Recovery Cases?

Friday, February 17, 2006
Luncheon Speaker
William W Schwarzer*
MS. MCKELVEY Good afternoon again everyone. At this time it is
my pleasure and honor to introduce you once again to Judge William W
Schwarzer who has come all the way from California to offer his
credentials and expertise to our Symposium. We really don't need an
introduction for him. Judge Schwarzer is such a legend in our profession. However, I want to highlight just a few things about the Judge
that are especially important.
As U.S. Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy said, "Judge
Schwarzer has been a brilliant, distinguished, and passionate servant of
the law and has served as a federal judge for nearly three decades."'
Members of the bench and bar nationwide are indebted to Judge
Schwarzer for his example and his service, and for his remarkable
contributions to the judiciary of the United States and to the law. He

* Senior United States Judge for the Northern District of California.
1. Presentation of the Edward J. Devitt Distinguished Service to Justice Award,
American Judicature Society (2004), available at http://www.ajs.org/ajs/awards/Devitt%20
Award/Schwarzer_whole%20bk/ltshorLfinal.pdf.
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has served as the director of the Federal Judicial Center. In 1987 Chief
Justice William Rehnquist appointed him to chair the newly established
Judicial Conference Committee on Federal and State Jurisdiction. And
in addition to that, as if he wasn't busy enough, he has authored more
than seventy-five books, monographs, and manuals regarding case
management and rules of procedure.
So at this time if we could welcome Judge William Schwarzer.
JUDGE SCHWARZER: Thank you, Rebecca and thank you for this
invitation to the deep south. It's a long way from northern California in
more ways than one.
Well, it's always difficult to follow an introduction such as you just
heard because whatever I say is going to be a letdown after the buildup
Rebecca has given me. She asked me to say a few words about the
Federal Judicial Center before I talk about Rule 68.2
The Federal Judicial Center where I served as director from 1990 until
1995 is an agency within the judicial branch designed to provide
training, education, research, and planning. The Center has about one
hundred employees, and it operates under the direction of a board of
directors, which is composed of six judges appointed by the U.S. Judicial
Conference and chaired by the Chief Justice.
The Center provides education and training for all of the judges in the
judicial branch: appellate judges, district judges, magistrate judges, and
bankruptcy judges, as well as court managers, court personnel, probation
officers, and pre-trial services offices. It provides about fifty education
programs each year serving about two thousand people. So the Center
has a broad mission.
The flagship program is the training of newly-appointed district
judges. It is a one-week seminar in Washington in which judges are
introduced to civil and criminal case management, as well as some of the
substantive areas like the ones you talked about today: civil rights,
employment discrimination, and various aspects of criminal law and
constitutional law. The focus, however, is not really on substantive law
because you can't do that much in a week, but rather the focus is to
prepare judges to deal with these issues.
In addition, the Center does workshops and conferences and special
programs. Some of the programs are in association with universities
and other think tanks.
During the time I was at the Center, I focused particularly on case
management. One of the items we produced was a new manual for

2.

FED. R. Civ. P. 68.
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complex litigation which some of you may have encountered in your
work. The purpose is to help judges deal with complex cases and
manage them effectively. The other area that was of particular interest
to us was the growing role that science plays in the work of federal
courts. We obviously could not teach people the science they encountered, but we designed the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence.3
How many of you have run across the Reference Manual on Scientific
Evidence? It is designed to introduce judges to various scientific
disciplines such as toxicology, epidemiology, DNA, statistical evidence,
and the like. It is not designed to teach them the substance of these
areas, but to teach them how to approach it: what questions to ask, how
to think about it and what the logical analysis is for issues of the kind
that fall within this area of expertise.
But my particular interest was in case management, and in connection
with that, I had the opportunity to spend a couple of weeks with an
Anglo-American legal exchange in London. While I was there, I ran
across the practice that is in use in the trial courts in England called
"payment into court." This permits the defendant to pay into court the
sum that the defendant believes the plaintiff will recover. If the offer is
rejected, they go to trial, and the plaintiff does not do as well; then the
plaintiff does not recover the fees and pays all of the defendant's fees.
Of course, that works within the fee-shifting environment in England
where the loser pays the fees.
That got me interested in the possibility of amending Rule 68 to make
it a fee-shifting offer of judgment rule. Now, I should say at the outset
that I'm not going to talk about what you talked about this morning,
that is the application of Rule 68 to the civil rights or employment
discrimination cases. And mind you, I believe the Marek4 case was
wrongly decided. I would amend Rule 68 to eliminate its application to
cases under fee-shifting statutes for two reasons: first, because it
contradicts the Federal congressional policy of creating private attorneys
general to enforce these laws; and second, because it's not necessary. In
the event that fees are awarded, the court can, and will, take into
account the extent to which the fees were reasonably incurred. If there
was a settlement offer that would not necessarily defeat the application
of fees but would influence the decision of the judge about the level of
fees the plaintiff should recover, the court will consider that, as well.
So my interest in Rule 68 was to amend it to make it a useful device
in general civil litigation in the federal courts by creating a fee-shifting
mechanism to produce the sort of coercive system that would force people

3.
4.

FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (2000).
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1 (1985).
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to take a hard look at the possibility of settling because of the risks they
could incur by not settling.
My purpose in doing this is not so much to increase the number of
settlements. As was said this morning, almost all the cases in the
federal courts are disposed of without trial. About half of them are
settled and about half of them fall by the wayside as a result of motions
or because they are abandoned. We do not need a rule to make people
settle their cases. The key is to get them to settle earlier. My view of
Rule 68 is that it should serve as a device to reduce the cost of litigation,
and particularly the cost of discovery and motion practice.
Now, the Advisory Committee on civil rules has been working on this
issue of discovery and litigation costs for years and has adopted various
amendments such as limiting the scope of discovery and enlarging
judicial control. But, unfortunately, discovery costs continue to spiral.
Cases that do not go to trial often go through expensive motion practice
and discovery before settlement. We needed a rule that provides an
incentive to bring cases to resolution earlier. And the question is
whether Rule 68 can be revised to achieve that purpose. That certainly
is not the case with the present rule because the exposure to having to
pay costs is not much of an incentive to settle early.
A revision of Rule 68 to make it a fee-based rule would be consistent
with the Federal Rules because there are at least two rules that now
provide for the recovery of fees: Rule 37(b)5 in connection with
discovery abuse and Rule 11(c) 6 in connection with the duty under Rule
11 to conduct a reasonable pre-filing investigation. But my view of Rule
68 is that it should not serve as a sanction, but rather as an incentive.
People should not be sanctioned for not wanting to settle their lawsuits
because there are all kinds of good reasons why a case may not settle.
Instead, Rule 68 should be seen as providing an incentive to minimize
discovery costs by bringing about early settlements.
Faced with the risk of having to pay the opponent's fees, defendants
will think about applying some of the cost savings realized by avoiding
lengthy discovery to make, to increase the settlement offer; and,
therefore, make it more attractive. Conversely, the plaintiff would
moderate his or her demand because of the amount of money that would
be saved by avoiding unnecessary discovery. That should enhance the
prospects for discovery.
Making such a revision of the rule applicable to general civil litigation
would seem to me to result in sweetening the defendant's offer and
moderating the plaintiff's demands. Now, of course, the coercive effect

5.
6.

FED. R. Crv. P. 37(b).
FED. R. Crv. P. 11(c).
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will diminish as the size of what is at stake in a lawsuit increases. In
large cases, the discovery costs are not a factor, so the rule will not have
a coercive effect in those kinds of cases. But in my experience, there are
many cases in the federal courts that are about moderate amounts such
as two hundred and fifty thousand dollars or less. In those cases, the
costs of discovery can easily make the litigation uneconomical.
A system to bring cases to early settlement can actually open the
courthouse door to meritorious claims which the plaintiff would
otherwise regard as unaffordable. Under the fee-based incentive rule,
a plaintiff would have a better chance of getting a favorable settlement
because the defendant could no longer rely on litigation costs as a
deterrent to the plaintiff's prosecuting his or her case. And, of course,
as I said, with an early settlement the plaintiff would be able to reduce
his or her costs which would help moderate the settlement demand.
In addition to that, of course, the plaintiff facing the risk of fees will
not want to make an excessive demand which he might not match if the
case went to trial. From the defendant's perspective, in turn, his
settlement offer may be improved by the savings the defendant would
realize in discovery costs from an early settlement. So, in substance, the
key is that the coercive effect of a fee-based rule would be to sweeten the
settlement fund at no real cost to the defendant while moderating the
plaintiff's demand to avoid the effect of fee shifting sanctions.
I would make some additional changes. I have already indicated that
I would eliminate the rule's application to civil rights and employment
cases and generally to cases under fee-shifting statutes, and there are
about a hundred of those statutes. They are listed in Justice Brennan's
dissent in Marek.7 Some of those are private attorney general statues.
Others are simply fee-shifting statutes like the patent statute, where
there are not the same policy considerations as in employment discrimination and civil rights cases. But I have not figured out a way to
distinguish the private attorney general's statutes from the other
statutes, so we may just have to eliminate fee-shifting statutes
altogether from the rule.
The rule should also have safeguards. As my article' described, an
award against a plaintiff should be limited to the amount of any
judgment so the plaintiff does not have to dig into his or her pocket to
come up with payment of fees if Rule 68 is applied. Conversely, the
award to the defendant should be capped so as to credit against that
award what the defendant would have paid had his or her offer been

7. 473 U.S. at 43-51 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
8. William W Schwarzer, Fee Shifting Offers of Judgment-An Approach to Reducing
the Cost of Litigation,76 JUDICATURE 147 (1992).
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accepted. So the amount of the offer that was rejected has to be
subtracted from the fee award because that is the amount of money that
the defendant saved by not having the offer accepted.
Finally, any award should be subject to judicial scrutiny if either party
seeks it so that there is a built-in safeguard that any award be fair and
reasonable. Either party could ask the court to review the award.
Another objective of this rule would be to reduce the role of discovery
as a profit center for lawyers. We heard some reference to that this
morning. If a Rule 68 offer is made, the client will obviously be brought
into the discussion whether the offer should be accepted or not, and the
calculation in the making of that decision takes into account the amount
of discovery that the lawyer intends to conduct if the offer is rejected.
In effect, the client is brought into the decision-making process about
how much ongoing discovery should be conducted, which is not generally
the case in ordinary litigation. So the rule would call upon clients, as
well as lawyers to focus hard on the economics of continuing the
litigation versus accepting the offer of settlement.
Finally, I wanted to point out that there appears to be strong support
among the bar for a rule that is two-way and involves fee shifting. The
Federal Judicial Center conducted a survey of some eight hundred civil
cases, and nearly three-fourths of the responding attorneys, which was
a high rate of response, favored an amendment to Rule 68 to allow for
two-way offers. The majority favored an amendment allowing at least
a portion of the offering party's post-offer fees. According to the lawyers
responding to the survey, if such a rule had been in effect, it would have
achieved a sizeable reduction in litigation expenses in thirty percent of
civil cases and would have expedited disposition in sixty percent of the
cases by having cases settled earlier. There was also strong support for
precluding an award of expenses in excess of a plaintiff's recovery
because such a safeguard would encourage litigation of small, but strong
claims.
That's my case for amending Rule 68. Does anyone have any
questions? If you want to point out the flaws in my proposal, I'll be glad
to listen.
AUDIENCE: Judge, could you tell us what piece of that proposal, if
any, came before the Federal Civil Rules Committee?
JUDGE SCHWARZER: Ed Cooper is better able to answer that.
MR. COOPER: Short answer is the whole thing. The only draft we
considered was one where you subtract from the fee award the difference
between the offer and the judgment, as Judge Schwarzer has described,
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and the cap. The plaintiff does not have to pay out of pocket, and the
symmetrical defendant does not have to pay more than the amount of
the judgment. An alternative provision for statutory fee-shifting cases
is simply taking them out or treating them in different ways. But the
enterprise was launched because of Judge Schwarzer's article, and the
draft was modeled very much on his proposal.
JUDGE SCHWARZER: And it ended up being tabled. Not rejected,
but tabled.
AUDIENCE: Judge, I gather that your proposal for change would
apply to serious personal injury cases; if so, and a plaintiff guesses
wrong, he or she will be subject to fees. How do you balance the rule's
saying that there is going to be fee shifting against the plaintiff, and
perhaps, the plaintiff's need to pay serious medical expenses out of any
verdict or judgment that occurs in the case?
JUDGE SCHWARZER: Well, I think my only answer to that is the
plaintiff will never be called on to pay attorney fees other than out of the
recovery in the lawsuit.
AUDIENCE: Which could include the medicals, right?
JUDGE SCHWARZER: Well, I didn't really focus on that, but
probably it would because it's part of the verdict. So that is obviously
going to be problematic, but that is the whole idea of this rule, to get
people to think about settling their cases and avoiding expense. But it
can be problematic. I do not doubt that. Yes.
AUDIENCE: Judge, was there any specific consideration of how the
proposal would apply in class action cases?
JUDGE SCHWARZER: The draft excluded class actions. I don't
think it would work in class actions. It is hard enough to make it work
in two-party cases. Any other thoughts? Yes.
AUDIENCE: Judge, was there any consideration of the fact that if
you had a fee and then you add attorney fees to it, it could hinder
settlements? If the defendant comes in with a real low number, the
plaintiff starts with a real high number, and you start working towards
the middle; is that essentially making it more difficult to meet the
original burden at trial? So, if the defendant started out with a ten
thousand dollar offer, by the end of it, he may have raised it to a
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hundred thousand dollars. Now the plaintiff has to deal with a hundred
thousand dollar offer for judgment, rather than the original ten
thousand?
JUDGE SCHWARZER: Well, the rule contemplates that new offers
can be made as the case goes along. I don't know if that answers your
questions, but it contemplates that there would be a series of offers and
demands from both sides, which you have to do in order to make it
effective and reflect the products of discovery.
AUDIENCE: Right. But with new offers, essentially you're bidding
against yourself in one sense. If the defendant gives a new offer, now
the plaintiff has a more difficult burden to reach if he does decide to go
try the case.
JUDGE SCHWARZER: That is true. That is in the nature of the
rule.
AUDIENCE: Right. But it might deter settlement in some sense if
the plaintiff is then saying he does not want to try to get the defendants
to raise their offer early on because that just makes the burden harder
for him in the long run.
JUDGE SCHWARZER: Well, I guess that is right. I don't think I
have an answer to that. Yes.
AUDIENCE: Do you have any view about whether the ten-day
current window for acceptance should be somewhat longer, either in the
kind of diversity litigation that was principally addressed by your
proposal or in federal fee recovery litigation?
JUDGE SCHWARZER: I heard that discussion this morning. I think
it is a dilemma. But if you give them ninety days, you can conduct a lot
of discovery in that ninety-day period. That may be productive, but it
would also be undermining the whole notion of fee-shifting offers of
judgment. Perhaps you could extend it to twenty-one days. I don't
know. It is one of those questions that would be best answered by
empirical evidence, which you cannot get. Yes.
AUDIENCE: What would you think about a system where some core
discovery was done, and then, instead of the rule, or perhaps in
conjunction with the rule, you go to the United States magistrate judge
to mediate a settlement conference? I don't know how you define "some
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core discovery," but some amount of depositions so that both parties feel
that they've done due diligence, at least enough to measure the claim in
their minds and in the minds of their client. I think at least those
conferences have indicated that the clients appreciate the judgement of
the magistrate judge based on facts that come out in that kind of core
discovery. I know we have done that in some civil rights cases. But,
don't you think that is maybe more effective than just lobbing Rule 68
offers, even if it became bilateral?
JUDGE SCHWARZER: Well, they are not mutually exclusive. My
approach to case management has always been to sit the lawyers down
early in the case, shortly after the filing, and try to identify what would
be the key discovery, the key witness, and the key information they need
to evaluate their case, rather than just having them flounder around.
In most cases, they've got an idea pretty quickly about what the value
of the case would be by focusing on discovery with a minimum of
expense. That would be the time for Rule 68 offers to be exchanged. I
mean it's not very desirable to have Rule 68 offers continue to be lobbed
back and forth as discovery goes on. It is best to focus on the critical
pivotal discovery early on. But I do not think you could adopt a rule
that establishes that procedure. It is judicial case management that sets
the case up for effective approaches to settlement. Yes.
AUDIENCE: This is really just a comment, Judge, but the rules are
being amended in the next couple of months to add the use of electronic
discovery. Electronic discovery has added a tremendous burden and
tremendous expense to litigation, so I don't know how that might relate
to your proposal. The purpose of my comment is simply to say that the
trend of increasing costs of discovery seems to be going against what we
are all trying to do, what we're talking about today, because I think the
amendments are going to put increased burdens on both parties.
JUDGE SCHWARZER: Well, the cost of discovery has been going up,
as I have been saying, and this will just accelerate the trend. But the
rule contemplates that there will be some early definition of the scope
of permissible electronic discovery, so they won't just run wild, and
identify what can be done within reason and consistent with what is at
stake in the lawsuit. I think that is really an underlying purpose of
these rules. But we will see. It would be nice if all the e-mails were
automatically eliminated after one year.

AUDIENCE: Yes, I agree.
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JUDGE SCHWARZER: Well, thank you again.
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